

Message Text

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ORIGIN NEA-02

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R 151834 Z MAY 73

FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY KUWAIT

AMEMBASSY JIDDA

USINT CAIRO

AMEMBASSY BEIRUT

AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI

AMEMBASSY RABAT

USINT ALGIERS

AMEMBASSY TUNIS

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 092299

E. O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: XF, PFOR, YE

SUBJ: YAR PROPOSES ARAB SUMMIT

FOLLOWING SENT ACTION TO SECSTATE INFO LONDON TEL AVIV

CINCEUR MAY 14, 1973 FROM SANAA REPEATED TO YOU:

QUOTE C O N F I D E N T I A L SANAA 813

E. O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: XF, PFOR, YE

SUBJ: YAR PROPOSES ARAB SUMMIT

CINCEUR FOR POLAD

DEPARTMENT PASS ALL ARAB CAPITALS

1. SUMMARY: IMPROBABLY, BUT APPARENTLY IN PART AS AN
ACT OF CONSCIENCE IN REACTION TO EVENTS IN LEBANON,
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YARG HAS LAUNCHED ITSELF INTO THE LARGER ARAB
ARENA BY PROPOSING CONVOCATION OF AN ARAB SUMMIT.
END SUMMARY.

2. DEP PRIMIN/ FONMIN NU' MAN INFORMED ME MAY 13 THAT
YARG HAS FORMALLY PROPOSED TO OTHER ARAB GOVERNMENTS
THAT AN ARAB SUMMIT BE CONVENED IN NEAR FUTURE TO
DEAL WITH EVENTS IN LEBANON AND CONSIDER PRESENT STATE
OF ARAB- ISRAELI PROBLEM IN GENERAL.

3. FONMIN EXPLAINED THAT THIS HAD BEEN TRIGGERED BY
A MESSAGE FROM KING HASSAN OF MOROCCO APPEALING TO ALL
ARAB STATES TO GIVE THEIR SUPPORT TO AN EQUITABLE
RESOLUTION OF THE CONFLICT BETWEEN LEBANESE GOVERNMENT
AND FEDAYEEN. IN CONSERING ITS RESPONSE TO THIS
APPEAL, YARG HAD DECIDED THAT CONFLICT BETWEEN GOL AND
FEDAYEEN COULD NOT BE CONSIDERED APART FROM THE LARGER
PICTURE IN THE AREA. UNLESS ARABS COULD AGREE ON
FUNDAMENTALS OF THEIR RELATIONSHIP WITH EACH OTHER AND
VIS- A- VIS ISRAEL, NO CEASEFIRE IN LEBANON WOULD BE
MORE THAN A PATCHWORK AFFAIR SOON TO BE BROKEN AGAIN.
ARAB GOVERNMENTS HAD TO DECIDE SUCH BASIC QUESTIONS AS
WHETHER THEY TRULY SUPPORTED A PALESTINIAN ENTITY,
AND IF SO WHICH, RATHER THAN SEPARATELY GIVING SUPPORT
TO VARIOUS PALESTINIAN CLIQUES FOR PURPOSES OS NATIONAL
ADVANTAGE. SHOULD A PALESTINIAN ENTITY BE ENCOURAGED
TO NEGOTIATE WITH ISRAEL? REALISTICALLY, WHAT SHOULD
ITS TERRITORIAL OBJECTIVES BE, TO ACHIEVEMENT OF WHICH
ARAB GOVERNMENTS COULD CONTRIBUTE THEIR COORDINATED
SUPPORT? IF FOR ONCE ARAB STATES COULD DEVISE A
COMMON POLICY, WHAT LEVERAGE DID THEY HAVE TO ACHIEVE
THEIR OBJECTIVES GIVEN FACT THAT WAR NOT CURRENTLY FEASIBLE?

3. WITH THESE CONSIDERATIONS IN MIND, NU' MAN STATED,
YARG HAD RESPONDED TO KING HASSAN' S APPEAL BY RECOMMEND-
ING A NEW ARAB SUMMIT OF KINGS AND PRESIDENTS.
MESSAGE TO THAT EFFECT HAD BEEN SENT TO RABAT. ARAB
AMBASSADORS IN SANAA HAD BEEN INFORMED MAY 12. YAR
AMBASSADORS IN ARAB CAPITALS HAD BEEN INSTRUCTED
RAISE WITH HOST GOVERNMENTS.

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4. OBVIOUSLY QUITE PLEASED WITH YARG' S INITIATIVE,
NU' MAN ASKED WHAT I THOUGHT OF THIS. I MADE TWO
OFF- THE- CUFF COMMENTS. FIRST, TO BE QUITE FRANK,
ARAB SUMMITS OF THE PAST HAD NOT BEEN PRODUCTIVE AND
I SAW NO PARTICULAR REASON TO THINK THAT A NEW VENTURE
WOULD BE EITHER. SECOND, A CEASEFIRE HAD BEEN
ACHIEVED IN LEBANON AND APPEARED TO BE HOLDING. I

DOUBTED THAT GOL WOULD WELCOME YEMEN' S PROPOSAL. IT COULD ANTICIPATE THAT IN A NEW SUMMI, ARAB GOVERNMENTS WOULD TEND OUTBID EACH OTHER IN HYPERBOLIC SUPPORT OF PALESTINIANS THUS IN EFFECT STACKING THE DECK OF DISCUSSION AGAINST GOL AND PUTTING PRESSURE ON IT GIVE MORE GROUND TO FEDAYEEN TO FURTHER DETRIMENT OF ITS OWN SOVEREIGNTY.

5. NU' MAN CONSIDERED THESE PROPOSITIONS. REGARDING THE FIRST, HE AGREED THAT PAST ARAB SUMMITS HAD NOT PRODUCED MUCH. BUT, HE NOTED, DESPITE VERBIAGE THEY HAD NEVER REALLY DEALT WITH ARAB- ISRAELI SITUATION AS A WHOLE. IN REALITY, ALL PREVIOUS ARAB SUMMITS HAD ARISEN OUT OF INTRA- ARAB CONFLICTS, PRIMARILY THE PRO- LONGED, SCARCELY CONCEALED CONFLICT BETWEEN EGYPT AND SAUDI ARABIA. EVEN KHARTOUM SUMMIT HAD IN REALITY BEEN CALLED TO CONSIDER ON WHAT TERMS EGYPT COULD EXTRICATE ITSELF FROM OCCUPATION OF YEMEN. OPTIMISM WOULD BE FOOLISH GIVEN DIFFERING ARAB ATTITUDES, BUT IT COULD JUST BE THAT A SUMMIT DEVOTED TO ENTIRETY OF ARAB- ISRAELI PROBLEM COULD PRO- DUCE A MORE EALISTIC, CORRGINATED APPROACH. IN ANY EVENT, DISCUSSION COULD HARDLY DO ANY HARM SINCE NOTHING COULD BE WORSE THAN PRESENT INDECISIVE- NESS, LACK OF REALISM AND DIVISION IN ARAB WORLD. GIVEN WEAKNESS OF SADAT' S INTERNAL POSITION THERE WAS A REAL DANGER THAT HE MIGHT ONE OF THESE DAYS TAKE A RASH ACTION WHICH WOULD LEAD TO ANOTHER ROUND OF FIGHTING, CONSOLIDATION OF ISRAELI HOLD ON TERRI- TORY SEIZED IN 1967 AND PERHAPS FURTHER EXPANSIO N.

6. ON MY SECOND POINT, NU' MAN SAID AFTER REFLECTION THAT I COULD WELL BE RIGHT. WHILE IT HAD NOT BEEN SO INTENDED, GOL MIGHT CONSTRUE YARG PROPOSAL, IF
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REALIZED, AS LIKELY LEAD TO CONCERTED PRESSURE AGAINST IT. NU' MAN SAID HE WOULD BE ANXIOUS HEAR GOL REACTION FROM YEMENI AMBASSADOR IN BEIRUT.

7. MY GUESS IS THAT YARG DID NOT THINK THIS ONE THROUGH VERY THOROUGHLY. OUR ESTIMATE IS THAT IT ACTED OUT OF A MIXTURE OF SERIOUS CONCERN (THERE HAS BEEN GENUINE ALARM HERE REGARDING SURVIVABILITY OF LEBANESE STATE) AND A PERHAPS SUBCONSCIOUS OPPORTUNISTIC IMPULSE PROJECT ITSELF ON THE PAN- ARAB STAGE IN SUCH A WAY AS TO " ONE- UP" THE PDRY. WE WILL STAY IN TOUCH WITH FONMIN AND REPORT REACTIONS OF OTHER ARAB STATES AS THEY ARE RECEIVED HERE.
CRAWFORD

UNQUOTE RUSH

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